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TRUST RECEIPT SECURITY IN FINANCING
OF SALES
L. VOLD*

The trust receipt device for financing import and wholesale trade,,
and manufacturing connected therewith, has to a considerable
extent displaced the more familiar devices for purchase money
security upon the goods that are dealt with. The law applicable
to trust receipt financing appears at first contact both complex
and obscure. Careful analysis of the business facts greatly simplifies the problem, however, and systematic analysis of the divided
property interests involved at successive stages in the transaction
brings comparative order out of the apparent complexity. The
subject of trust receipt financing of sales may therefore profitably
be set forth from the point of view of an analysis of the business
facts and an ascertainment of the divided property interests at
successive stages in that business transaction.
I. THE BusINEss

BACKGROUD-NEED FOR SECURED PRODUCTIVE
CREDIT

The immensity of present-day marketing operations in the process of distribution of goods from original producer to ultimate
consumer for the satisfaction of human wants requires large use of
credit. Ordinary consumers have neither the means nor the inclination to pay so largely in advance as to finance them. Individual
producers usually are equally unable to do so. The marketing process
requires to greater or less extent the service of certain intermediate
agencies and a more or less extensive system of financial backing for
their operations. The credit that carries the business is therefore,
as it were, the goose that lays the golden eggs.
Credit advances for business operations require the giving of
effective security. The more effective it is the larger proportionally
may be the amount of the advance. The goods to be handled in
sales transactions may themselves conveniently be used as the
security. Frequently, as a practical matter, they constitute the
principal if not the only security available to the seller. How to
arrange the transaction so as most effectively to utilize the very
goods sold has therefore become a very immediate problem. The
familiar types of security, such as liens, pledges, chattel mortgages,
and conditional sales, have all been.-contrived with reference to
certain recognized business needs, and their various particulars
*Professor of Law, University of Nebraska.
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and restrictions are often but poorly adapted to getting practical
business done on a purchase money security basis.
Manifestly the unpaid seller's lien and his legal power to stop the
goods in transit in the event of the buyer's insolvency, while convenient and useful to the seller in collecting the price where the
buyer is not yet in possession, are not adapted to serve as security
devices in credit transactions where delivery to the buyer is made.
The same may be said of the seller's power of disposal of goods
shipped pursuant to a contract with the buyer under a bill of lading to
the seller's order, reserving title in him as security. Where the
buyer, as a practical business matter, must be entrusted with possession under a sale on credit, any security for the price which is
dependent on the seller's power to control possession is manifestly
not well adapted. Were the law of liens and pledges developed so
broadly that despite a redelivery to the pledgor the pledge could
still remain operative with respect to third parties dealing with the
pledgor, that form of security could with but slight adaptation be
made practically available for cases of purchase money security in
goods purchased. Yet, since any such development of the law of
pledge would seriously impair the protection against secret liens
afforded as a matter of policy to third parties dealing with pledgors,
so broad a development is hardly to be expected.
Parties have often resorted to the familiar chattel mortgage
device for providing purchase money security in the goods dealt
with. However, restrictions on foreclosure and recording requirements severely limit the security holder's powers under the chattel
mortgage and hence greatly impair its usefulness as a credit carrier.
These restrictions historically were imposed to prevent oppression
of the borrower by the lender and to prevent deception of third
parties dealing with the mortgagor in possession through the assertion of superior secret liens. These reasons do not apply with the
same force where the mortgage is given, not to secure a loan, but
to secure the purchase price of the goods dealt with in current commercial transactions. Ordinary chattel mortgage statutes nevertheless make no distinction based on such considerations. When,
in order to avoid the restrictions on the effectiveness of the chattel
mortgage security in commercial cases, the conditional sale device
was developed, legislation in many places imposed restrictions of
analogous character upon the conditional sale, notably in recording
requirements. These have cut down the effectiveness of the conditional sales security and so far impaired its range of usefulness
as a credit carrier based on purchase money security in the goods
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purchased that the business world has turned to new devices and
produced the trust receipt.
The tripartite trust receipt device as found in present-day
wholesale business is usually not subject to the restrictions which
recording acts impose upon the chattel mortgage and conditional
sale. Nor is the protection afforded by the device dependent on
continuance of possession, as in the case of a pledge. Providing
effective security in the goods dealt in, it greatly enlarges the range
of credit available for productive business operations, and, consequently, the range of possible satisfaction of human wants.
II.

PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF THE

BUSINESS

TRANSACTION

The typical trust receipt transaction, while somewhat complex
when viewed in detail, is in its broad business outline rather simple.
It is a tripartite affair, in which a business dealer or manufacturer
buys goods from a distant seller for manufacture or distribution
to subsequent purchasers, a third party banking house paying the
distant seller and taking title to the goods on shipment as security,
but in due time entrusting their possession to the buyer for limited
use necessary in turning them into cash in the course of his business,
when the advances can be repaid from the proceeds. Though operating in the deal on borrowed money, the buyer is the party who carries
the business risk and earns the business profit. The banking house
carries unusually heavy credit risks, since the business dealer or
manufacturer, who has little or nothing of his own assets invested
in the particular goods, is given possession of the goods for use in
his business. The trust receipt device aims to give the banking
house such adequate security in the goods as to make available the
necessary credit for carrying on productive marketing under such
conditions.

III.

THE SUCCESSIVE BUSINESS STAGES IN THE STANDARD.TRIPARTITE
TRUST RECEIPT TRANSACTION

a. The Undifferentiated PreliminaryStages
The standard trust receipt transaction familiar in modem importing and wholesale business is with respect to the property
incidents involved in its earlier stages in no essential different from
other transactions differently financed. It begins, like other transactions, with a preliminary negotiation in which a business dealer
or manufacturer ascertains on what terms desired goods can be
purchased from a distant seller and what financial backing can
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be obtained from a banking house on the security of the goods to
be bought.
In the next stage which may be called that of procuring credit,
the prospective buyer contracts with the banking house for the
opening of credit in his favor. In the import trade this is often
supplied in the form of a letter of credit from the banking house to
the distant seller or his banking correspondents promising to pay
drafts for the price of goods purchased by the business dealer or
manufacturer in accordance with specified terms, the drafts to be
accompanied by bills of lading for the goods, made out either to the
order of the banking house or to the order of the shipper and properly indorsed by him to the banking house. In the domestic wholesale trade the arrangements may often be more informal, but in
any event the understanding is that the banking house will pay the
distant seller's drafts for the price when accompanied by order bills
of lading giving it control over the goods.
The next stage may be called the stage of shipment under contract.
The buyer places his order with the distant seller who ships in
accordance with the terms of the credit arranged for, taking from
the carrier an order bill of lading in the form indicated. Contemporaneously the seller draws his draft for the price on the banking
house, or on the buyer, as the case may be, and procures it, accompanied by the order bill of lading as collateral security, to be for-

warded through banking channels for presentment for payment.
The next stage may be called the stage of banker's advances
on the security of the order bill of lading, which is reached when
the banking house pays the draft, taking as security the order bill
of lading and thereby acquiring the power of disposal of the goods.
The particular steps may vary somewhat in detail, depending on
what facilities for making the exchange of money for documents
have in the instance been made available. Thus in the import trade
it is common for the seller to draw on the foreign correspondent of
the banking house under the terms by the letter of credit, the details
of surrender of the documents in exchange for payment being there
carried out and the correspondent forwarding the documents to its
principal. In the domestic wholesale trade, where the arrangements
often are more informal, the distant seller may send the draft for
the price, with the order bill of lading attached, through independent
banking channels for presentment. The banking house financing
the deal then pays the independent banking correspondent which
acts for the seller, taking the order bill of lading as security. In
many instances, doubtless, these details are handled at the same
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time with the giving of the trusf receipt by the business dealer or
manufacturer, the next step in the business process. The important
element, however, is that the banking house advancing the price
maintains control of the order bill of lading until it gets the trust
receipt. In many instances the arrangements are such that the
distant seller draws, not a sight draft, but a time draft for the price,
which the financing bank accepts on presentment instead of paying
it, the seller then realizing his payment through immediate discount
of the accepted draft.
b. The Stage of the Technical Trust
The first stage in which the trust receipt transaction assumes
characteristics distinguishing it from transactions otherwise financed
may be called the stage of the technical trust. The essence of the
transaction is that it is expected that the goods will be turned over
to the buyer before repaymefht, for limited use in his business.
When they arrive at their destination, therefore, it is common for
the banking house to surrender to the buyer the order bill of lading
to enable him to get the goods from the carrier and use them in
the limited ways agreed upon. At the time of surrendering the order
bill, the banking house requires the buyer to sign and deliver to it
the so-called "trust receipt". The trust receipt recites in substance
that the bill of lading and the goods held thereunder are and continue to be the property of the banking house as security for its
advances, that they are merely turned over to the business dealer
or manufacturer to be held in trust for the banking house and used
only for certain purposes which are set out, until the advancements
have been repaid, and that the banking house may at any time
cancel the trust and resume possession. This short interval, during
which the buyer holds the order bill of lading under the terms specified
in the trust receipt, may be called the stage of the technical trust.
c. The Stage of Limited Agency
When the business dealer or manufacturer surrenders the order
bill of lading to the carrier, he receives the goods into his own possession with authority from the banking house to deal with them in
such limited manner as is indicated by the terms of the trust receipt.
This stage may for convenience be called the stage of limited agency.
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IV. THE

DIVIDED

PROPERTY INTERESTS UNDER THE STANDARD
TRIPARTITE TRUST RECEIPT ARRANGEMENT

-a. The Divided Property Interests During the Undifferentiated Prelim-

inary Stages
In the earlier undifferentiated stages of the standard tripartite
trust receipt transaction, the property interests involved are no
different from those encountered in other sales transactions going'
through similar stages and otherwise financed. Thus at the stage
of preliminary negotiation neither personal obligations nor property
interests in any specific goods are as yet involved. In the stage of
procuring credit, contractual obligations may be assumed as between the business dealer or manufacturer and the banking house,
but no property interests in specific goods are as yet involved. In
the stage of shipment under contract by the distant seller, property
interests in the specific goods are for the first time encountered;
but as yet nothing arises which is peculiar to trust receipt transactions. At this stage the beneficial interest in the goods passes to
the buyer by appropriation when the goods are shipped, the seller
reserving, however, the power of disposal of the goods as security
for the purchase price by making the shipment under order bills of
lading. It is common legal speech to describe this arrangement
by saying that the distant seller who takes the-bill of lading to the
order of the banking house or to his own order has reserved the legal
title to the goods as security.
At this early stage in the transaction are encountered the divided
property interests familiar in connection with shipment of goods
under contract under order bills of lading. Possession is in the
carrier. The beneficial interest is in the party who ordered the
goods.' If the distant seller shipped to his own order, the legal
title giving him the power of disposal is reserved in him as security.'
If he procured the bill of lading to the order of the banking house
but the banking house has as yet advanced nothing, the final practical
effect is the same, though its description in legal terms is a little
more complicated. In such case it would ordinarily be recognized
that-the banking house has the legal title, but holds it on behalf of
1

See UNIFORMI SALES ACT, § 19, rule 4 (2), §§ 20 (2), 22 (a).
WILLISTON, SALEs (2d ed. 1924) § 284, with cases cited. Convenient illustra-

2

tions of the same position where goods are shipped under contract with a purchaser, but shipped under straight bills of lading naming the shipper as consignee
are the following cases: Rudin v. King-Richardson Co., 311 Ill. 513, 143 N. B. 198
(1924) (books); Banik v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry., 147 Minn. 175, 179 N. W. 899
(1920)

(hoops).
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the shipper, the distant seller, for his security for the purchase
price. Meantime, as the seller is himself in possession of the bill of
lading, he effectually prevents any dealing with the document by
the banking house until it advances the purchase price to him and
receives the order bill of lading in exchange.3
When the banker makes advances on the security of the order
bill of lading, the seller is out of the picture so far as property in the
goods is concerned. The banking house has succeeded to his security
interest. 4 At this point, therefore, possession of the goods is in the
carrier, the beneficial interest in the goods is in the business dealer
or manufacturer, while the banking house holds the legal title as
security for its advances, with a power to dispose of the goods if
the beneficial owner defaults in repaying its advances. The banking
house, moreover, has the legal power to cut off the beneficial interest
of the business dealer or manufacturer by wrongfully negotiating the
order bill of lading to an innocent purchaser for value without notice.5
The standard of commercial honesty of reputable banking houses is
so high, however, that direct and intentional abuse of this power is
seldom observed in the reported cases.' So far, therefore, the transaction presents divided property interests of no special peculiarities
attributable to trust receipts. The new phases are those which

follow.
b. The Divided Property Interests Duringthe Stage of Technical Trust
During the stage of the technical trust the business dealer or
manufacturer becomes the holder of the order bill of lading for the
goods, but subject to the terms set out in the trust receipt designed
to preserve the security interest of the banking house. The parties
at this stage of the transaction have created a superficially anomalous
situation. By the indorsement and delivery to him of the order bill
of lading, the indicia of title and the accompanying complete power
of control and disposal of the goods are transferred to the dealer or
manufacturer who is already the beneficial owner, At the same time
the private agreement of the parties, as shown by the express recital
in the trust receipt, is that the property in the goods is to continue
in the banking house for its security.
The apparent contradiction between what the parties have done
and what they have said is readily dealt with, however, if regard is
3

and cases in notes 49, 5o thereto.
WILLISTON, loc. cil. supra note 2, and authorities cited in its accompanying

WILLISTON, SALES § 286,
4

notes 26, 27. See also WLLISTON, SALES §§ 286a, 286b, 286c.
5
UNIFoRm SALES ACT, § 33.
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had to the practical business aspects of what they seek to accomplish thereby. The form of the bill of lading, being to order, has
permitted its effective use as a security device for the financing
involved in the earlier stages while the goods were in transit. Now
that the transit is ended and the goods are to go into the possession
of the one who is to use them, business convenience requires that
the banking house turn over the order bill of lading to the beneficial
owner in order that he may attend to the practical details of getting
the goods from the carrier and turning them into money. The banking house must for the moment trust to the honesty of the business
dealer or manufacturer. It puts special reliance upon him at this
point, for as holder for the moment of the order bill of lading, he
has the legal power to cut off the security interest of the banking
house by negotiating it, though wrongfully, to an innocent purchaser for value without notice,6 although the private agreement
that the property continue in the banking house for its security is
enforceable between the parties.7 At this stage, therefore, the security
interest of the banking house is continued in existence but is for
the time being not in the form of legal title but rather is much like,
if not identical with, an equitable lien, or the equitable interest of the
beneficiary of a trust.8 The business dealer or mailufacturer, already
the beneficial owner, may now as indorsee of the order bill of lading
be described in familiar stereotyped terms as holder of the legal title
to the goods, being, however, trustee for the security of the banking
house to the extent of its advances.
If the more precise terminology of powers be preferred in describing the resulting situation, it is even easier to see that the property
interests here are divided. Possession is in the carrier, who has a lien
for freight, which gives the carrier certain limited powers with respect
to the goods. The business dealer or manufacturer, who bears the
6

Commercial Nat. Bank v. Canal-Louisiana Bank, 239 U. S. 520, 36 Sup. Ct.
C. A. 7th, 1915) (coffee);
Arbuthnot, Lathan & Co. v. Richheimer & Co., 139 La. 798, 72 So. 251 (1916)
194 (I916) (cotton); In re Richheimer, 221 Fed. 16 (C.

(coffee); Roland M. Baker Co. v. Brown, 214 Mass. 196, Ioo N. E. 1025 (1913)

(hides).
7
For supporting dicta, see In re Reboulin Fils & Co., infra note io (cherries);
In re Cattus, infra note io; Century Throwing Co. v.'Muller, infranote io (silk);
In re K. Marks & Co., infra note 37; In re James, infra note io (automobiles);
Baring v. Galpin, infra note io (iron rods); Moors v. Wyman, infra note 35
(hides); Peoples Nat. Bank v. Mulholland, infra note 28 (hides); Moors v. Kidder, infra note 33 (shellac); Drexel v. Pease, infra note lo (sardines); Scott v.
Industrial Finance Corp., 265 S. W. 181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) (automobiles).
8

Mention need only be made of the well settled rule that specific performance
may be had of an agreement for security.
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risk of loss and is entitled to the business profits, who has the liabilities of ownership and the powers giving him the advantages of
ownership, is the beneficial owner. As holder of the order bill of
lading he also has the power wrongfully to negotiate the bill of
lading to an innocent purchaser for value without notice and thereby
to cut off the security interest of the banking house, but the latter
has the power to retake the goods while the beneficial owner still has
them under his control, and to apply them through sale or otherwise
to the satisfaction of its claim for advances. To protect itself against
dishonest negotiation of the order bill of lading where the dealer
or manufacturer is hard pressed for cash a well-advised banking
hbuse might well put subsequent takers on notice of the trust by
making appropriate recitals in its indorsement on the order bill of
lading.'
c. The Divided PropertyInterests During the Stage of Limited Agency
When the carrying out of the trust receipt transaction reaches
the stage which in this paper is called the stage of limited agency,
the bill of lading has become spent, the business dealer or manufacturer having surrendered it to the carrier and received possession
of the goods. There is now no longer the apparent inconsistency
between what the patties have recited in the trust receipt and what
they have done in dealing with the order bill of lading. Their agreement recites in terms that the banking house throughout has the
property in the goods as security for its advances and that the business dealer or manufacturer is to hold possession for the banking
house, making only certain specified limited use of the goods until
the advances thereon have been repaid. Nothing in what the parties
have done materially qualifies at this stage the effect of these terms.
There is therefore at this stage no legal obstacle to giving effect to
the recitals in the trust receipt. While courts and writers have at
times been greatly puzzled to find appropriate names in which to
express the results, 10 it is abundantly clear that the business dealer
9

Such, in substance was the form of the indorsement in Farmers & Mechanics
Nat. Bank v. Logan, 74 N. Y. 568 (1878) (wheat).
1
eThe clearest recent judicial utterance defining the tripartite trust receipt
relationship is found in the case of In re James, 3o F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929)
(automobiles).
For other cases of expressions devoted to the difficulty of precise definition
of the relationship see:
In re Reboulin Fils & Co., 165 Fed. 245 (D. N. J. 19o8) (cherries); Charavay
& Bodvin v. York Silk Mfg. Co., 17o Fed. 81g (C. C. S. D. N. Y. I9O9) (silk);
In re Cattus, 183 Fed. 733 (C. C. A. 2d, I9IO); Century Throwing Co. v. Muller,
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or manufacturer, beside the beneficial interest in the goods, now also
has possession. The banking house has a property interest in themn '
which the parties have described in terms appropriate to its holding
the title as security. Although the possessor has authority to use
the goods in his business, he now has no power to cut off the security
interest by making a transfer to a purchaser. Expressed in terms
of powers in each party with respect to the goods, some of the applications of which are set out below, the fundamental fact of divided
property interests in the goods at this stage in the transaction is
easily recognized.
Before taking up in detail the practicalapplications of this analysis
a little explanation may fittingly be devoted to the merely verbal
difficulty encountered if the stereotyped language of legal title
is 'used in describing the property interests at this stage. How, it
may be asked, is the legal title now in the banking house, when in
the stage of technical trust immediately preceding it was in the business dealer or manufacturer, considering that all that has happened
since is that the person who all along was beneficial owner has now
also secured possession? The realities of ideas and of business facts
are not, however, slaves to mere words. If it is insisted that legal
title was in the business dealer or manufacturer in the stage of the
technical trust, and no regard is had to analysis of what powers
re Dunlap Carpet Co., 206 Fed. 726
(E. D. Pa. 1913) (wool); Roth v. Smith, 215 Fed. 82 (C. C. A. 3d, 1914) (silk);
197 Fed. 252 (C. C. A. 3d, 1912) (silk); In

In re Richheimer, supra note 6 (coffee); In re A. E. Fountain, 282 Fed. 816
(C. C. A. 3d, 1922); In re Cullen, 282 Fed. 902 (D. Md. 1922) (automobiles);
Baring v. Galpin, 57 Conn. 352, 18 Atl. 266 (1888), 5 L. R. A. 300 (1889) (iron
rods); Downing Co. v. Shawmut Corp., 245 Mass. 1O6, 139 N. E. 525, 27 A. L. R.
1522 (1923) (nuts); Drexel v. Pease, 133 N. Y. 129, 30 N. E. 732 (1892); Jones v.
Commercial Investment Trust, 64 Utah 151, 228 Pac. 896 (1924) (automobiles).
Recent writers commenting on this newly developing branch of the law have
put somewhat divergent interpretation on the legal materials available. See
Taylor, Trust Receipts (1921) 6 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 168; Frederick, The
Trust Receipt as Security (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 395 and 546; Hanna, Trust
Receipts (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 545.
For a comprehensive annotation of trust receipt cases: Note (1927) 49 A. L. R.
282.

3The cases, supra note IO, clearly recognize this feature, though often expressing it in different ways. Further authorities may be found in connection with the
detailed analysis, infra notes 22-31.
In Brown v. Mass. Hide Corp., 218 Fed. 769 (C. C. A. 5th, 1915), leather
to which the banking house held title under an importer's trust receipt was sold
by the importer, together with other leather not subject to receipt, and it was
impossible to identify the proceeds of each. The bankers, under the doctrine of
subrogation, were held entitled to enforce their claim against the entire fund..
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were involved therein, it may still be answered in as dogmatic and
verbal a manner that the title may pass by appropriation in accordance with a prior agreement. The agreement of the parties, as literally expressed in the trust receipt, usually is that the title is to continue in the banking house. Giving their agreement the only interpretation consistent with their acts in indorsing the order bill of
lading to the buyer, this must mean that the title was intended to
revert to the banking house as soon as the business dealer or manufacturer ceased to be holder of the order bill of lading. Accordingly, the
carrier's delivery of the goods to the business dealer or manufacturer
constitutes the act by which, according to the agreement of the
parties, the title is reappropriated to the banking house for its security. In connection with this verbal objection and its corresponding
verbal answer, moreover, and for its possible bearing in discussing
the application of chattel mortgage recording acts to trust receipt
transactions, it is to be noted that though the banking house has
thus reacquired the technical legal title, yet the banking house has
had throughout a security interest in the goods which was acquired
in the first instance from the distant seller. In consequence there is
no occasion from the form of the transaction for construing the standard tripartite trust receipt transaction as a chattel mortgage, its substance never at any time having been a conveyance of the property
interest from the borrower to the lender as security for a loan.
The fact of divided property interests in the goods during the
stage of limited agency is conspicuously apparefit when the respective
powers and liabilities of the business dealer or manufacturer and of
the banking house, as shown in the current court decisions, are
examined in detail. It is therefore very inadequate, and may at
times prove misleading, to describe the relations of the parties as a
mere bailment in which the banking house is the owner and the
business dealer or manufacturei is a mere bailee.'2 The latter enjoys
nInstances of such inadequate expressions in the opinions of courts are not
hard to find. Thus, in Brown Bros. & Co. v. Billington, 163 Pa. 76, 29 Atl. 904
(1894), the court says the contract was but a bailment for sale, without any
title or ownership of any kind in the bailee in any event. The point actually
decided, however, is not open to criticism, that execution creditors of the beneficial owner take subject to the security holder's priority. So in General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Hupfer, II3 Neb. 228, 202 N. W. 627 (1925), the court said
that until compliance with the terms of the trust receipt the dealer was a bailee
and no more. The point decided in the case, that the trust receipt arrangement
was not a conditional sale or chattel mortgage and therefore did not fall within
the local recording acts, seems correct, as will be shown later in this discussion,
infra note 37 and accompanying text. It seems very unfortunate to rest that
correct result on the indefensible ground that the trust receipt arrangement is a
mere bailment and nothing more.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
most of the substantial benefits of ownership, limited by the bank's
security interest. He has possession. He may use the goods so far
as he does not violate the terms of the trust receipt. He has the power
to extinguish the security interest of the banking house by tendering
the amount advanced on the goods, thereby becoming owner free
and clear. 3 In consequence he enjoys the chance of gain incident
to ownership of the goods. Enhancements in their market value
accrue to him on his tendering merely what is due the banking house.
The same remark manifestly applies to accessions to the goods in
cases of further manufacture, and to their increase, if any, in case of
live animals. He may also transfer his interest in the goods, 14 subject,
of course, to the security interest of the banking house, 5 his transferee succeeding to his position with respect to the goods and enjoying
the same powers to realize on them for himself by tendering the outstanding advances. In case of repossession and resale by the banking
house he is entitled to any balance remaining after its reimbursement."6 It seems accurate to say that he has the ordinary beneficial
incidents of ownership, except as qualified by the security interest.
The business dealer or manufacturer also carries the substantial
burdens of ownership in the goods. He bears the risks. If the goods
are accidentally destroyed, or deteriorate in quality or value, or
are stolen or lost, it is his loss.17 He remains personally liable for

the amount advanced thereon by the banking house irrespective
of what later happens to the goods themselves. Even in case of
retaking by the banking house and resale in the attempt to realize
on its security he remains personally liable for any deficiency.' s
The expenses in dealing with the goods, such as storage, freight,
customs dues, and costs of manufacture are his, not chargeable to
3

See for instance Drexel v. Pease, supra note io. The point seems never to
have been directly questioned in the reported cases. The point is expressly
covered by the language used in many current trust receipts, in providing that
the restrictions imposed thereby shall be operative until the necessary payments
have been made to discharge the advances of the banking house.
14Perkins v. Halpren, 257 Pa. 402, IOI Atl. 741 (1917) (dress goods).
"In re Dunlap Carpet Co., supra note io (wool); Roth v. Smith, supra note io
(silk-security holder under trust receipt prevails against trustee in bankruptcy
of the beneficial owner's transferee on consignment); Commercial Credit Co. v.
Peak, 195 Cal. 27, 231 Pac. 340 (1924) (automobiles); Perkins v. W. A. Lippincott Co., 26o Pa. 473, 103 Atl. 877 (1918) (dry goods).
"6Gerseta Corp. v. Equitable Trust Co. of N. Y., 241 N. Y. 418, i5o N. E. 5oi,
43 A. L. R. 1320 (1926) (silk).
"7Charavay & Bodvin v. York Silk Mfg. Co., supra note io (silk). The sane
position, though not often directly discussed, is also implicit in the point decided
in most trust receipt cases.
'sfIid.
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the banking house. 19 His interest in the goods or their proceeds is
open to execution or attachment by his creditors, subject, of course,
to the prior security interest of the banking house.20 On the sale
of the goods, the incidental warranties are his obligations, not those
of the banking house.2' Looking at the substantial property incidents that the parties have arranged for, therefore, rather than
merely at the wording "title to the goods" which the parties have
used in the trust receipt, it is very clear that the business dealer or
manufacturer is much more than a mere bailee. He is, rather, the
beneficial owner of the goods during this stage of limited agency
in the carrying out of the trust receipt transaction.
Similar examination of the interest held by the banking house
during this stage is equally convincing that it holds its legal title
merely as security. It may assign its claim for advances with its
security interest therefor. 22 It may repossess the goods and apply
them on its claim.23 If there is a deficiency it can hold the beneficial
owner, its debtor, for that amount.24 If there is any balance over,
it must account to the business dealer or manufacturer for the
excess.2 5 Its interest in the goods is extinguished by his tender of
the amount due. 2 While the forms of speech used to describe the
interest of the banking house at this stage have widely differed,
there is substantial unanimity in the result that it holds the title
to the goods merely as security for its advances.2 7 The sweeping
26

Downing Co. v. Shawmut Corp., supra note io (advances for customs dues
on importation of nuts). The point is frequently expressly covered in well drawn
contracts, especially in cases where further manufacture is contemplated.
2
'The present writer has noticed no cases in which this position has ever been
questioned. The cases assume the point in discussing the question of priority
between such lienors and the banking house. See for instances, cases, infra notes
34,35.
21

The point must follow inevitably from the oft repeated position that the
banking house is not a seller but a mere encumbrancer. For discussion of the
point in an analogous case, see Tolerton & Stetson Co. v. Anglo-California Bank,
112 Ia. 7o6, 84 N. W. 930 (IgOI).
22
Commercial Credit Co. v. Peak, supra note I5 (1924) (automobiles).
23 Scott v. Industrial Finance Corp., 256 S. W. I81 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924)
(automobiles). 24Charavay & Bodvin v. York Silk Mfg. Co., supranote io (silk).
25In Gerseta Corp. v. Equitable Trust Co. of N.Y., supra note x6 (silk), this
principle was applied in favor of the beneficial owner's creditor, invoking the
doctrine of subrogation to the additional collateral security which had been
required by the banking house.
"6Drexel v. Pease, supra note Io.
2"See the cases, supra note Io.
In Moors v. Bird, 19o Mass. 400, 77 N. E. 643 (19o6) (paper) while the bank-

ing house was referred to as having title to the goods, it was required to refund
mistaken excess payments made to it by the purchaser for credit on account of
the beneficial owner's claim for purchase money.
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language of the trust receipt purporting to vest or retain in the banking house the entire title and absolute property interest is limited to
the purpose of safeguarding this interest. 8 It is not intended to throw
to the banking house either the business risks or the business profits
of the trust receipt transaction. 29 Having by the original agreement
a claim to the proceeds in the event of sale as security for its advances,
enforceable between the original parties, its collection of the proceeds is not a preference voidable in later bankruptcy proceedings. 0
Between the original parties it is of course entitled to the proceeds
so far as necessary to repay its advances.3'
V.

APPLICATION OF RECORDING ACTS TO TRIPARTITE TRUST RECEIPT
TRANSACTIONS

In the absence of applicable recording acts the ascertainment
of what property interests in the goods are held respectively by the
business dealer or manufacturer and by the banking house ordinarily
answers the question of what each can successfully claim against
transferees or creditors of the other. Each can transfer only what
he has, and the creditors of each can take only what he has. Caveat
emptor. Caveat creditor. That is the general rule of property. Consequently, if no recording acts are applicable, the banking house
may ordinarily retake goods sold by the business dealer or manufacturer in violation of the terms of the trust receipt, even though
28In People's Nat. Bank of Boston v. Mulholland, 228 Mass. 152, 117 N. E. 46
(1917), the banking house permitted the business dealer to take possession
on giving the customary trust receipts. The dealer permitted the goods covered
by the trust receipt to get mixed with other goods of the same type. It was
held the banking house was entitled to assert its claim against the entire commingled mass so far as necessary to discharge its advances thus applying for its
protection to that extent the doctrine of tortious confusion of an owner's goods.
"9As early as in the case of Drexel v. Pease, supra note IO, at I36, .3o N. E. at
734, this position was carefully formulated in the following language, "The
correspondent's position is one of ownership so far only as is necessary to secure
him for the advances he made upon the -merchandise described in the bill of
lading, and in such a case as this he is bound to sell upon receipt of the purchase
price from the principal, or in other words, upon receipt of the amount he advanced upon its credit. In no other sense is the correspondent the owner of the
property."
That similarly the banking house is not chargeable with expenses of carrying
on the business operations, see Downing Co. v. Shawmut Corporation, supra
note io (nuts).
301n re Perlhefter, 177 Fed. 299 (S. D. N. Y. 191o) (shoes).
31Brown v. Green & Hickey Leather Co., 244 Mass. 168, 138 N. E. 714 (1923)

(hides).
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they were sold to an innocent purchaser for value without notice. 32
Such purchaser, on the ordinary application of the rules of property
law, cannot acquire a larger property interest than his seller had.
The same rule manifestly prevents pledgees, mortgagees, or other
encumbrancers in good faith for value from acquiring any interest
not subordinate to the already vested security interest of the banking
house. 3 Attaching or execution creditors of the business dealer or
manufacturer can only take subject to the security interest of the
banking house.34 The same rule applies as obviously to an assignee
for the benefit of creditors, receiver in insolvency or trustee in
bankruptcy of the business dealer or manufacturer, who can take
and apply for the creditors only the assets to which the business
dealer or manufacturer was beneficially entitled." Caveat emptor.
Caveat creditor.
Ordinary chattel mortgage recording acts do not apply to the
standard tripartite trust receipt transaction. Those acts of the
ordinary type apply to that form of security transaction which has
traditionally been familiar under the name of chattel mortgage, which
consists of a conveyance by the borrower, the mortgagor, of a property interest in his goods to the lender, the mortgagee, as security
for a loan. The tripartite trust receipt transaction is entirely different.
It is not a conveyance from the borrower to the lender at all, but is
a conveyance from a third party, the distant seller, carrying the
beneficial ownership to the borrowing business dealer or manufacturer
and, in consummation of the same transaction, putting the security
interest in the banking house. Recording acts, drawn to apply to the
chattel mortgage transaction familiar to the lawmaker when the
nCanadian Bank of Commerce v. Baum, 187 Pa. 48, 40 Atl. 975 (z898); see
Ohio Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Schneider, 202 Ia. 938, 211 N. W. 248 (1926)
(automobile-the purchaser having notice in this case).
In 1875, even before the name "trust receipt" had become familiar in business
practice this result'was reached in Dows v. Nat. Exchange Bank, 91 U. S. 618,
(1875).
Cases where the sale can be upheld on the score of apparent authority are of
course distinguishable. See cases infra note 43.
33
Century Throwing Co. v. Muller, supra note io (silk); In re James, supra
note IO (automobiles); Commercial Credit Co. v. Peak, supra note 15 (automobiles); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hupfer, supra note 12 (automobiles);
Moors v. Kidder, lO6 N. Y. 32, 22 N. E. 818 (2887) (shellac).
3
Brown v. Billington, supra note 12 (bicycles); Mershon v. Wheeler, 76 Wis.
502,

45 N. W. 95 (I89O) (tin plates).

35In re Cattus, supra note so; In re James, supra note io (automobiles);
Baring v. Galpin, supra note 2o (iron rods); Moors v. Wyman, 146 Mass. 6o, 15
N. E. 104 (1888) (hides).
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enactment was made, cannot be held to cover the newer and different form of security presented by the trust receipt transaction without judicial construction very greatly enlarging their scope.36 Such
judicial enlargement cannot be justified on the score of legislative
intent. Such acts do not purport to cover security transactions of
all kinds but only apply to the designated mortgage form of security.
Moreover, the subsequent enactment of recording acts to apply to
the novel form of security presented by conditional sales is a legislative interpretation that chattel mortgage recording acts do not
apply to security transactions generally, but are limited to their
specified mortgage form of security. Accordingly it is generally held
that the ordinary type of chattel mortgage recording act does not
apply t6 the tripartite trust receipt form of security. The security
interest of the banking house may therefore be successfully asserted
against purchasers, encumbrancers, or other successors of the business dealer or manufacturer, even though they were without notice
thereof and even though the trust receipt was not recorded as a chattel mortgage. 37
Ordinary conditional sale recording acts similarly do not apply
to the tripartite trust receipt transaction. The familiar situation
to which such acts apply is a conveyance from the conditional seller
to the conditional buyer of the beneficial interest in the goods,
coupled with delivery of possession to the conditional buyer, the
conditional seller retaining the legal title as security for the pur36General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hupfer, supra note 12 (automobiles).
In Moors v. Drury, I86 Mass. 424, 71 N.E. 81o (19o4), it was held that the
trust receipt transaction was not a mortgage within the meaning of a statute
which required a mortgagee to surrender his security to the assignee in insolvency in order to be permitted to prove his claim in the insolvency proceedings.
'kIn re Reboulin Fils & Co., supra note io (cherries); In re K. Marks & Co., 222
Fed. 52 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915); People's Nat. Bank v. Mulholland, 228 Mass. I52,
117 N. E. 46 (1917) (hides); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hupfer, supra
note 12 (automobiles); see Capital Motor Corp. v. Lasker, 138 Va. 630, 123 S. E.
376 (1924) (automobiles).
See also cases supra note 33.
Contrato the statement in the text is the case of In re Richheimer, supranote 6
(coffee) in which it is asserted that the trust receipt arrangement, with security
title in the lender and possession in the borrowing importer, is against the public
policy of Illinois as declared by statute requiring either change of possession or
record for all mortgages, trust deeds, or liens. This case is greatly weakened,
however, because the point was probably not necessary for the decision, the case
being one of transfer of negotiable documents of title procured, it would seem,
with the security holder's authority. The later case of Sherer-Gillett Co. v.
Long, 338 11. 432, 349 N.E. 225 (1925) substantially repudiated the public policy

announced.
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chase price. This form of security therefore is a reservation by the
seller of a security interest in himself on his conveyance to the buyer
of the beneficial interest and the possession of goods. Again it is
apparent that the form of the tripartite trust receipt transaction
is quite distinct. That transaction is not a reservatioh of a security
interest by the lender on a transfer by him of the beneficial ownership and delivery of possession to the borrower. Its form is a conveyance from a third party, the distant seller, who conveys the beneficial interest to the business dealer or manufacturer and, as a part
of the same transaction, before possession has been delivered to the
beneficial owner, conveys the security interest to the banking house
which advances the purchase price. The same reasons against
enlarging the scope of conditional sale recording acts by mere judicial construction are applicable as in the case of chattel mortgage
recording acts. Accordingly, it is usually held that the security
interest of the banking house can be successfully asserted against
parties claiming through the business dealer or manufacturer, even
though there was no notice and even though it was not recorded as a
conditional sale. 38 Legislation going beyond the ordinary chattel
mortgage or conditional sale recording acts is necessary if trust
receipt transactions are to be subjected to recordation.
VI.

POLICY OF EXTENDING RECORDING ACTS TO TRIPARTITE TRUST

RECEIPT SECURITY

Whether tripartite trust receipt transactions as such should be
recorded in order to be enforceable by the security holder against
purchasers or creditors claiming through the beneficial owner is a
question of policy involving legislative judgment of the relative
importance of certain conflicting interests. The need for such legislation seems much less, while the objections to it seem much stronger,
than in the ordinary cases of either chattel mortgages or conditional
sales. In the case of chattel mortgages, two general purposes are
served by the legislation. In the first place, subsequent parties,
purchasing from the mortgagor for value without notice or extending him credit on the strength of his continued ownership of property
which admittedly was formerly his own and still is in his possession
without visible change in his relations to it, are protected against
the assertion of secret liens on the property. In the second place,
the mortgagor himself, in the statutory formalities for foreclosure,
is protected against undue sacrifice of his interest in the property by
summary informal foreclosure by the security holder. The appearance
"'See cases, supra notes 33, 37.
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of continued unencumbered ownership of property formerly held
free and clear and still in his possession tends to give a false basis
for dealings and for credit if secret liens can be asserted against it.
The mortgagor, as the historic borrower at the mercy of the lender,
needs the protection against sacrifice of his interest in summary
foreclosure. Reasons in favor of chattel mortgage recording acts
as applied to the ordinary loan transaction are therefore strong
reasons. Nor is it apparent that the recording requirement seriously
impairs the obtaining of legitimate loans by the mortgagor. Legislative judgment that chattel mortgage recording acts serve useful
social ends in connection with ordinary loan transactions can therefore be readily accepted.
In the case of conditional sales analogous considerations do not
seem so strong. The conditional buyer was not formerly the owner,
as in the case of the chattel mortgagor, but is in possession and
rightfully uses the goods freely as his own. The problem of secret
liens prejudicing those who deal with him as owner is therefore
present in a milder form than in the case of the mortgage loan.
The conditional buyer, moreover, is under no compulsion in making
the purchase, while the chattel mortgagor, by the stress of his necessities, is often at the mercy of the mortgagee lender in borrowing.
Accordingly it is not strange that conditional sale recording acts
are not so universally adopted in the various states as are chattel
mortgage acts, nor that the foreclosure permitted under conditional
sales is usually more summary than it is under chattel mortgage acts.
In the tripartite trust receipt transactions the need for recording
for the protection of other interests is relatively slight. The problem
of secret liens prejudicing those who deal with the business dealer
or manufacturer in possession for the time being of the goods is
reduced to comparatively small proportions, if not to the vanishing
point. The business dealer or manufacturer was not owner at all
before the transaction and was not in possession. He does not
long remain in possession, the goods passing in trade in the ordinary
course of business. He does not while he has them deal with the goods
except in very limited ways. There is no more basis from appearances for relying on him as owner than there is in the ordinary case
of a factor in possession or in the case of a lessee, cases where the
ordinary rules of property are given unrestricted application in
transactions with purchasers and creditors. Nor can it persuasively
be contended that the business dealer or manufacturer, as a borrower
from the banking house, is so forced into the deal by the stress of
his necessities and at its mercy as lender that in that aspect he much
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resembles the traditional mortgagor in a'loan transaction, whom
historic equity law protects from oppression by the mortgagee.
The need for recording acts in the tripartite trust receipt transaction is thus comparatively slight. On the other hand, compliance
with recording acts in such transactions would burden the ordinary
business to be done, relatively much more than in the cases where
the traditional chattel mortgage or conditional sale are ordinarily
used. For goods passing onward in course of trade, as do the goods
ordinarily financed through trust receipt transactions, the burden
of delay and expense of recording and, in turn, discharging from
record for every successive transaction would very seriously impair
the dispatch of business by sellers. Neither bank nor merchant
can as a practical matter search the records in handling individual
items in the business of the day. Similarly, buyers of goods in ordinary course of commercial trade would be equally unable, as a practical
matter, to search the records for the history of every commercial
purchase. Furthermore, in such cases, purchasers in the ordinary
course of business are now protected without recording just as they
are in the case of consignments, by the application of the doctrine
of apparent authority. 39 Those who do not deal with the business
dealer or manufacturer in the ordinary course of business would
seem to have here no greater need for protection against secret liens
than they have in dealing with factors or lessees in cases of consignments or leases.
It is true that the scope of chattel mortgage or conditional sale
recording acts' has in a few states been so enlarged by recent legislative amendments or by judicial interpretation as to include tripartite trust receipt transactions, 0 but under present conditions
39
See discussion,
40

infra note 43.
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Boddeker, 274 S. W. IO16 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1925) (automobiles).
In In re Bettman-Johnson Co., 25o Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 6th, x918) (cherries) the
business dealer's trustee in bankruptcy as receiver for creditors was held to
prevail over the banking house claiming under an unrecorded trust receipt, under
the very broad terms of the Ohio conditional sale statute, OHIo GEN. CODE (Page,
1926)

§ 8570.

The case of In re Richheimer, supranote 6 (coffee) reached this result by judicial
interpretation, in the light of what was said to be the local public policy of Illinois
against secret liens. See however Sherer-Gillett Co. v. Long, supra note 37, a
conditional sale case.
In Industrial Finance Corp. v. Cappleman, 284 Fed. 8 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1922),
it was held under the South Carolina statute, S. C. CODE OF LAws (1912) §§ 3542,
3740 [now to be found in, S. C. CODE OF LAWS (1922) §§ 5312, 5519], that the
security holder under an unrecorded trust receipt could not prevail against the
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it seems unlikely that this broad extension of the recording principle
to the individual tripartite trust receipt transactions will be rapidly
or widely copied. Should it make much headway, it would seem
inevitable that similar extensions, resting for their merits upon
substantially identical grounds, will be demanded for ordinary
wholesale consignment or leasing transactions. It seems more
likely either that trust receipt transactions will be left, as is common
now, to be governed merely by the ordinary rules of property law,
or that some legislation specially adapted for them will provide for
the filing once for all of a general statement showing the existence of
the financing arrangement but not requiring interference with the
routine business of the commercial day by requiring the filing of the
41
individual transactions.
VII. APPARENT AUTHORITY-FACTORS ACTS
Two situations may be identified in which the security interest
held by the banking house under its trust receipts during the stage
of limited agency can be lost through dealings between the business
dealer or manufacturer and other parties. One is the type of situation where the legal rule of apparent authority applies. The other
is the type of situation covered by certain factors acts, enacted in a
few states only.
It is well established law that if a principal actually authorizes
his agent to sell goods a sale in accordance with the authority passes
the principal's property in the goods. The authority may be shown
by express terms or may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the transaction. Thus if the possessor under the trust
receipt resells to others with the consent of the banldng house,
beneficial owner's trustee in bankruptcy even though he had retaken possession
as authorized by the terms of the trust receipt, the retaking being regarded as a
forbidden preference. For a criticism of such. application of the statute, see
Frederick, op. cit. supra note io, at 407, 408. That retaking is not a preference
where the original contract is good between the parties, see In re Perlhefter,
supra note 30.

"In 1925 the legislature of Ohio passed a new statute declaring the conditional
sale statute inapplicable, but providing that for a large range of trust receipt
transactions described in the statute, they should be valid without filing as
against certain parties dealing with the signer of the trust receipts, provided that
the party to whom such trust receipts are issued file an affidavit setting forth
that an arrangement for financing through trust receipts has been made. OHio
GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 8568.
A somewhat sinilar position is taken in the proposed draft Uniform Trust

Receipts Act, a recent published discussion of which appears in Hanna, op. cit.
supra note io, at 556-562.
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thereby to secure the cash with which to repay advances, the purchaser acquires the property in the goods free and clear. Where the
business dealer or manufacturer habitualily resells without carefully
observing the terms specified in the trust receipt, and the facts are
known to the banking house, its manifested acquiescence suffices
to prove the necessary authority. 42 Where the resales are made in the
usual way in the ordinary course of business, moreover, the interest
of the banking house is cut off, even though made in violation of the
terms of the trust receipt, if the facts are such that the legal rule of
apparent authority is applicable. In the domestic trade in automobiles, the banking house often permits the retail dealer to display
in his showroom the cars covered by the trust receipt, where they
appear to be a part of his sale stock, thus assisting in creating the
appearance that the dealer had a right to sell. His sale in the ordinary
course of business is in such cases regarded as within the rule of apparent authority. This situation some writers refer to in terms of
estoppel. The purchaser in such cases takes clear of the security
interest of the banking house even though the sale was made without
observing the terms and conditions specified in the trust receipt.4
Where, however, the resale is not made in the ordinary course of
business, the security interest remains unaffected and can be enforced against the purchaser even though he had no notice, the
appearance of authority to sell in the ordinary course of business not
justifying reliance thereon where sales are made out of the usual
course. 44
Factors acts, in force, may also enlarge the power of the business
dealer or manufacturer to cut off the security interest of the banking
house. At common law a factor given authority to sell on behalf
4Clark v. Flynn, 120 Misc. 474, i99 N. Y. Supp. 583 (Sup. Ct. 1923) (automobiles); Brown v. William Clark Co., 22 R. I. 36, 46 Atl. 239 (1900) (cotton);
Jones
v. Commercial Investment Trust, supranote Io (automobiles).
3

4Glass v. Continental Guaranty Corp., 81 Fla. 687, 88 So. 876 (1921), 25
A. L. R. 312 (1923) (automobiles); Commonwealth Finance Corp. v. ScHlutt,
97 N. J. L. 225, II6 Atl. 722 (1922) (trucks); Clark v. Flynn, supra note 42
(automobiles); New England Auto Investment Co. v. St. Germaine, 45 R. I.
225, 121

Atl. 398

(1923)

(automobiles); Jones v. Commercial Investment Trust,

supra note IO (automobiles).
See also Commercial Acceptance Trust v. Bailey, 87 Cal. App. 117, 261 Pac.
743 (i927) (automobile). In this case the court says the fact that the sale was
for an antecedent debt does not prevent its being in the ordinary course of business-a very questionable generalization.
"Ohio Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Schneider, 202 Ia. 938, 211 N. W. 248 (1926)
(automobile); Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Baum, 187 Pa. 48, 4o Atl. 975
(1898).
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of his principal does not without more thereby have the legal power
46
to make a valid pledge of his principal's goods. Factors acts in
England changed the rule and, for the protection of security holders,
put the burden on principals where their factors prove unfaithful.
In New York and Massachusetts, and perhaps in a few other states,
factors acts of this type are in effect. 4 Accordingly, in those states,
if in a trust receipt case the goods are entrusted to the business
dealer or manufacturer on such terms, expressed or inferred from
the surrounding circumstances, that the latter has from the banking
house the broad general authority of a factor to make resales, generally the factors act applies. In such cases, therefore, should the
business dealer or manufacturer pledge the goods to another, the
new security holder would take priority over the banking house
holding the trust receipt.47
VIII.

VARIANT TYPE-TRIPARTITE BAILMENT RECEIPT SECURITY

Careful analysis of what are ordinarily described as trust receipt
transactions reveals that, while the term describes with reasonable
accuracy the standard type dealt with in the foregoing pages, there
is also a variant type which might with greater accuracy be described
as a bailment receipt transaction. For describing this the term
"bailment receipt" is occasionally used in the reports; but no established usage carefully distinguishes the two terms, and "trust receipt"
is by usage extended to cover both varieties of transaction. The fact
difference between the standard and the variant type is found neither
in the language actually employed in the trust receipt, nor in the
name by which it is usually called, but in the fact in the variant type
that the bill of lading under which the distant seller made shipment
the goods deliverable
was taken in the form of a straight bill making
48
to the banking house as the named consignee.
-The leading case is Paterson v. Tash, 2 Strange H 78 (i743). The cases are
very numerous.
46
A good discussion of the policy of the Factors Act, N. Y. CONS. LAWS, c. 45
(PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW) § 43, may be found in Freudenheim v. Selig Gutter,
201 N. Y. 94,94 N. E. 64o (I91i).
47Blydenstein v. N. Y. Security & Trust Co., 67 Fed. 469 (C. C. A. 2d, 1895);
International Trust Co. v. Webster Nat. Bank, 258 Mass. 17, 154 N. E. 330
(1926), 49 A. L. R. 267 (1927) (wool); N. Y. Security & Trust Co. v. Lipman, 157
N. Y. 55i, 52 N. E. 595 (1899).
Under the Virginia Traders Act, VA. CODE ANN. (1924) § 5224, a somewhat
similar result is reached with respect to lien creditors. See Capital Motor Corp. v.
Lasker, 138 Va. 630, 123 S. E. 376 (1924).
48Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Baum, 187 Pa. 48, 40 Atl. 975 '(1898);
Brown v. William Clark Co., supra note 42; Nat. Bank v. Citizen's Bank, 93
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The property interests during the preliminary undifferentiated
stages are substantially identical with those found under the standard
type. The difference in legal effect between the two appears in the
next stage. The standard type goes through a stage above described
as the stage of the technical trust. The variant type has no technical
trust, inasmuch as no title is ever vested by the banking house
in the business dealer or manufacturer through making him holder
of an order bill of lading. The banking house merely authorizes him
to take possession of the goods from the carrier. Therefore, in this
type the stage of limited agency succeeds directly to the undifferentiated earlier stages. The trust receipt, however, is apt to be couched
in the usual terms, reserving title in the bank as security for its advances, the legal effect of which is nowhere dontradicted by conduct to
the contrary in indorsing to the business dealer or manufacturer an
order bill of lading. In this type, therefore, since the banking house
retains title as security throughout, and merely authorizes the business dealer or manufacturer to take possession from the carrier, the
term "bailment receipt" seems more appropriate to the actual
transaction than does the term "trust receipt." The banking house
is not here subjected to the risk of having its security interest cut
off by a wrongful transfer of the bill of lading in the stage of technical
trust. Its perils as security holder are merely such perils as are
encountered in the stage of limited agency. From the standpoint of
the effectiveness of the security of the banking house, therefore, this
variant type affords better protection than does the standard type
of tripartite trust receipt transaction. On the other hand, the business convenience of making the shipment under order bills of lading
is in other respects very great, especially in permitting the making
of financing arrangements to suit as the individual shipment is
nearing destination. Hence the tripartite trust receipt transaction
is much more frequently found in what is here described as its
standard type, dealing with shipments under order bills of lading,
than in the described variant type where shipments have been made
under straight bills of lading naming the banking house as con49
signee.
S. W. 209 (Tex. Civ. App. I9O6) (cotton); Walters v. Western & A. R. Co., 66
Fed. 862 (C. C. A. 5th, 1894) semble (grain).
See also the general discussion in WILLISTON, loc. cit. supra note 3, much of
which is applicable also to this situation.
49The cases, supra note 48 may serve for illustration. Most of the reported
cases where trust receipts for goods have played a conspicuous part in the litigation seem to have been cases where the shipments were made under order bills
of lading.
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IX.

BIPARTITE TRUST RECEIPT ARRANGEMENTS
CONSTITUTING
PLEDGES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES, OR CONDITIONAL SALES

The effectiveness of the tripartite trust receipt arrangement in
providing security to the banling house valid against third parties
dealing with the business dealer or manufacturer without the necessity of recording, not unnaturally has led to attempts to secure
similar advantage for the security holder in other relations by insertion of the magic terms "in trust", or "trust receipt". Doubtless, too,
parties have at times used in other situations the forms adapted
to tripartite security transactions without any very clear perception
of the legal differences. In the case of pledges it is often convenient
that the pledged goods or securities should be redelivered to the
pledgor for temporary or special purposes. Under the law of pledge
ordinarily applicable, the effectiveness of the security as against
third parties who have dealings with the pledgor is defeated by
redelivery to the pledgor. If on the redelivery a trust receipt could
change this result by the recital that the goods were to be held by the
pledgor in trust for the pledgee whose interest was to remain unaffected, the device obviously would offer a wide range of unaccustomed advantage for pledgees. As obviously, however, the recital
is only a slightly varied form of expressing what has long since become faniliar as the bargain between pledgor and pledgee that the
security should continue in spite of the redelivery of possession.
That familiar bargain, being one for security, is specifically enforceable between the parties,50 giving rise to what is ordinarily called
an equitable lien. It may sometimes be held good against general
creditors of the pledgor.5 ' It is not effective, however, in ordinary
cases to safeguard the security interest against dealings by the pledgor
with third parties, the equitable lien being cut off on a transfer of the
goods by the pledgor to a purchaser or encumbrancer in good faith
50

Fletcher Am. Nat. Bank v. McDermid, 76 Ind. App. I5O, 128 N. E. 685

(1920) (automobile); Hickock v. Cowperthwait, 21o N. Y. 137, 103 N. E. 1111

(i913) (corporate stock).
5'The point, with citation of authorities, is discussed in Hanna, op. cit. supra
note 1o, at 551-554.

It was held, however, in In re Shulman, 206 Fed. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1913), that a

promise by the owner of goods to hold them as security for a banker's loan to
him without being accompanied by delivery in pledge did not enable the bank
to prevail over the borrowing owner's trustee in bankruptcy.
To the same effect is Bank of North America v. Penn Motor Car Co., 235 Pa.
194, 83 Atl. 622 (1912) (automobiles) resting on the local rule in Pennsylvania

that as against creditors a conveyance or encumbrance without change of possession is conclusively deemed to be fraudulent.
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for value without notice.' The mere use of the terms "in trust" or
"trust receipt" therefore does not serve to change the ordinary legal
incidents of redelivery to the pledgor in an ordinary bipartite pledge
transaction."
Substantially similar reasoning disposes of the bipartite trust
receipt transaction as a substitute for a chattel mortgage. As indicated above, this form of security transaction is a conveyance of
the security interest in the mortgaged chattels from the borrowing
mortgagor to the lending mortgagee. Such a conveyance of security
interest in goods from the borrower to the lender falls within the
chattel mortgage recording requirements, whether it has been called
by the name of mortgage or not. Thus a conveyance by the borrower
to the lender, in form absolute and by the parties called a sale outright but intended as security, is held to be a chattel mortgage
and is dealt with accordingly- 4 The same is true though the parties
give such a conveyance the name of a conveyance "in trust" or
52
Bodenhammer v. Newsom, 5 Jones L. 107 (N. C. 1857) (horse); Fletcher Am.
Nat. Bank v. McDermid, supra note 50 (automobile); Norfolk Southern R. R. v.
Barnes, 104 N. C. 25, IO S. E. 83, 5 L. R. A. 611 (1889); F. L. Shaw Co. v. Coleman, 236 S. W. 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) (automobiles); see Canal-Commercial
Trust & Say. Bank v. New Orleans etc. Ry., 161 La. IO5i, 109 So. 834 (1926), 49
A. L. R. 274 (1927) (sugar).
There is some contrary authority. See Clare v. Agerter, 47 Kan. 604, 28 Pac.
694 (1892) (horses).
In Thacher v. Moors, 134 Mass. I56 (1883), a pledgee delivered to a warehouseman to hold on his behalf, the warehouseman not being known to be a
partner with pledgor. The warehouseman procured a loan on the goods as owner.
It was held on these special facts that the original pledgee's interest could be
asserted against the encumbrancer.
See Hanna, op. cit. supra note IO, at 551-554 for discussion of authorities
favoring an extension of pledge security in such cases.
n"When a pledgee of negotiable securities, holding them as collateral security
for the pledgor's debt, returns them to the pledgor temporarily, on a trust receipt,
he takes the risk only that third persons may, in good faith, and to his prejudice,
deal with the holder as the apparent owner of the securities, but he does not
thereby forfeit the pledge to other creditors of the pledgor." O'Niell, C. J., in
Canal-Commercial Trust & Say. Bank v. New Orleans etc. Ry., supra note 52,
at Io66, lO9 So. at 839, 49 A. L. R. at 282.
See also Fletcher Am. Nat. Bank v. McDermid, supra note 50 (agreement
by pledgor to hold automobile in trust for pledgee, without delivery of possession,
not operative to protect security interest of pledgee against dealings by pledgor
with third persons); Arena v. Bank of Italy, 194 Cal. 195, 228 Pac. 441 (1924)
(bipartite trust receipt taken on redelivery of pledged goods to pledgor held not
enforceable against attaching creditor of pledgor).
"Illustrative of the point are Root v. Republic Acceptance Corp., 279 Pa. St.
55, 123 Atl. 650 (1924), and Barker Piano Co. v. Commercial Security Co., 93
Conn. 129, IO5 Atl. 328 (1918). The cases are very numerous.
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require the borrower to sign a "trust receipt" instead of a chattel
mortgage. Like other chattel mortgages, these are enforceable
between parties,55 but for enforcement against certain classes of
third parties must be recorded as required by the chattel mortgage
recording act.56
If a seller in the first instance delivers goods to a buyer, taking
his note for the price and a paper signed by the buyer called a trust
receipt reciting that the property belongs to the seller but is delivered
to the buyer in trust for storage only until the note is paid, this
transaction, being in fact a conveyance by one to the other of the
beneficial interest and possession of the goods, reserving the legal
title as security until payment, is of course a conditional sale. The
fact that the parties have called it by another name while carefully
preserving all its attributes does not prevent the courts from giving
effect to the realities.5 7 Accordingly, such transactions are subject
to conditional sale recording acts despite the -"trust receipts" terminology used by the parties. 58
SSIn the case of Scott v. Industrial Finance Corp., 265 S. W. I8i (Tex. Civ. App.
1924), this accounts for the result between the parties even on the possible inter-

pretation of the facts that the transaction was a bipartite trust receipt arrangement.
-'American & British Securities Co. v. American & British Mfg. Corp., 275
Fed. 121 (S. D. N. Y. 1921) (automobiles); In re A. E. Fountain, supra note 1o
(merchandise in stock); Jordan v. Federal Trust CO., 296 Fed. 738 (D. Mass.
z924) (automobiles); Commerce-Guardian Trust & Say. Bank v. Devlin, 6 F.
(2d) 518 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925) (automobiles); Keystone Finance Corp. v. Krueger,
17 F. (2d) 904 ,(C. C. A. 3d, 1927) (automobiles); In re Sachs, 3o F. (2d) 510
(C. C. A. 4th, 1929) (automobiles); People's Nat. Bank v. Mulholland, 224 Mass.
448, 113 N. E. 365 (1916) reversed in 228 Mass. 152, 117 N. E. 46 (1917) on
rehearing as to the facts involved (hides); Commonwealth Finance Corp. v.
Schutt, supra note 43 (trucks); New England Auto Investment Co. v. St. Germaine, supra note 43 (automobiles); Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Teich, 283
S. W. 552 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) (automobiles); see Mohr v. First Nat. Bank of
Hanford, 69 Cal. App. 756, 232 Pac. 748 (1924) (automobiles).
It may be remarked that in Jordan v. Federal Trust Co. the transaction started
out as a tripartite transaction and the security might have been preserved had
the parties been properly advised in the first instance instead of resorting to a
merely colorable warehousing scheme. Later a paper called a trust receipt was
given. Being where found a mere bipartite conveyance for security, it was held a
mortgage.
57Mohr v. First Nat. Bank of Hanford, supranote 56 (automobiles).
58
1n re Shiffert, 281 Fed. 284 (E. D. Pa. 1922) (automobiles-holding transaction a conditional sale, but not discussing recording acts as such); In re FordRennie Leather Co., 2 F. (2d) 750 (D. Del. 1924) (skins); Maxwell Motor Sales
Corp. v. Banker's Mortgage & Securities Co., 195 Ia. 384, 192 N. W. 19 (1923)
(automobiles); Commonwealth Finance Corp. v. Schutt, supra note 43 (trucks).
See also In re Cullen, supra note IO (automobiles). Whether the court correctly
interpreted the facts here as a bipartite conditional sale, with a subsequent assign-
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A legitimate argument to be addressed to the legislature is that
not all chattel mortgage situations are necessarily alike in their
business aspects. It may well be urged that legislatures should make
a distinction in legal requirements respecting a chattel mortgage
on goods already owned given by the mortgagor as security for a
loan-the traditional type for which the familiar mortgage law
was developed-and the chattel mortgage for part of the purchase
price on new goods given to the seller by the buyer as security at
the time of the purchase. 9 In the first there is much more danger
of oppression than there is in the second. There is also greater
danger of misleading third parties dealing with the mortgagor without
knowledge of secret liens, It may be urged, therefore, that ordinary
recording requirements should not apply to the purchase money
mortgage type. No such distinction has been taken, however, in the
legislative drafting of the ordinary chattel mortgage recording acts.
Courts have accordingly held the chattel mortgage recording
acts applicable to all transactions which are shown to be chattel
mortgages in fact irrespective of the business purposes they were
projected in the instance to serve.

X.

THE FACT BORDERLINE BETWEEN TRIPARTITE AND BIPARTITE
TRUST RECEIPTS

The conspicuous differences, with regard to the application of
recording acts, between tripartite trust receipt transactions proper
and bipartite chattel mortgages or conditional sales cloaked in
the words of trust receipts, naturally lead to close inquiry as to
whether the particular transaction is in reality tripartite or bipartite.
It may be granted without discussion that the standard tripartite
trust receipt transaction is found if the distant seller ships the goods
under contract with the business dealer or manufacturer, taking
the bill of lading to the order of the banking house, and delivers the
bill of lading to the banking house on getting payment of his purchase price before the bill of lading is turned over to the business
dealer or manufacturer in exchange for his trust receipt. On such
facts it is clear that the security interest in the goods held by the
banking house for its advances came to it not by a conveyance
ment by the conditional seller to the financing company rather than as a tripartite
transaction is open to question. If the facts are thus correctly interpreted, the
correctness of the conclusion that it makes no difference that the paper was
called a trust receipt is not open to question.
"The proposed draft Uniform Trust Receipts Act would bear out this suggestion, in extending its range to cover certain bipartite as well as tripaitite transactions. See Hanna, op. cit. supra note io, at 556, 557.
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from the borrower but by a conveyance from the distant seller.
The transaction, therefore, is not an ordinary chattel mortgage. 60 It
is equally clear that this transaction is not an ordinary conditional
sale with the banking house as assignee of the conditional seller,
since the distant seller, while reserving the title as security, has
not given control over possession to the business dealer or manufacturer."' On the other hand the distant seller may reserve title
as security by shipping under a bill of lading to his own order, and
send the bill of lading, indorsed, with a draft on the purchaser for
the price, for collection through ordinary banking channels. If
the purchaser pays the draft with his own funds and thus secures
the bill of lading for the goods, and thereafter arranges to convey
the goods to the banking house as security for advances, the security
transaction is bipartite, and will be at once recognized as in fact a
chattel mortgage. 2 The security interest in the goods in such a case
came to the lending banking house by a conveyance from the borrower, not from an outside third party such as the distant seller.
An intermediate situation may be encountered, however, in which
the fact distinction between a tripartite and a bipartite transaction
is not so clear. It seems to be common now in the financing of automobile. retailers for the distant seller who has made a shipment of
cars to forward all the papers by arrangement to an intermediary
bank in the retailer's town. That bank, having no interest of any
sort in the deal, then acts in accordance with its instructions both for
the distant seller and for the distant banking house or financing
company which is to finance the deal, neither of whom can maintain
local offices in every town where goods are to be distributed and their
undertakings carried out. The intermediary bank thus acts for
the distant seller in collecting the draft for the price and turning
over the bill of lading to the financing banking house which provided
60 See for illustrations cases, supra notes 33, 37.
61
See supra note 38.
62
1n Keystone Finance Corp. v. Krueger, supra note 56, the same result was
reached where the financing company furnished money directly to the retail
dealer in cars with which to take up the bill of lading, the retailer using the
money for that purpose and giving the financing company a bill of sale of the
cars as security.
To the same effect on substantially similar facts is New England Auto Investment Co. v. St. Germaine, supranote 43 (automobiles).
In Finance & Guarantee Co. v. Stitt, 21 F. (2d) 718 (C.C.A. 3d, 1927), the
financing company similarly furnished the check directly to the retail dealer
with which to take up the bill of lading for the cars shipped, the parties going
through the form of giving a lease of the cars from the financing company to the
dealer. It was held not valid against the retailer's trustee in bankruptcy.
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the funds for its payment. At the same time it acts for the financing
house in paying the draft with funds provided for the purpose and
in receiving the bill of lading as security for the advance. At the
same moment it also acts for the financing banking house both in
getting from the automobile retail dealer his note and his signed trust
receipts covering the cars in question, and in delivering to the automobile retail dealer the order bills of lading giving him control over
the goods. Since these details are all carried out simultaneously
when the automobile retail dealer calls at the intermediary bank,
it has been plausibly argued that the bill of lading was delivered
directly to the retail dealer and that hence the security interest
in the goods held by the financing banking house under the trust
receipt must be a chattel mortgage, as it came to the banking house,
not from the distant seller, but from the borrowing retail dealer.0
In answer to this contention it may be suggested that there is nothing
in the simultaneousness of the several operations which prevents the
transaction from being given effect, as the parties evidently intended,
as a transfer of the bill of lading from the distant seller through the
financing banking house to the retail dealer. Accordingly it seems
proper to hold, carrying out the evident intention of the parties
and permitting thereby the productive functioning here of a very
convenient security device, that the case just described is still a
tripartite trust receipt transaction.,
In the absence of legislative changes in the scope of the recording acts, therefore, a conveyance by a debtor to his creditor of a
security interest in goods, being in fact a chattel mortgage, is subject
63In re Cullen, supra note io (automobiles); In re Schuttig, i F. (2d) 443
(D. N. J. 1924) (automobiles).
This position is also hinted at in the lower court, In re James, 3o F. (2d) 55I
(N. D. N. Y. 1927) which was later reversed on appeal, 3o F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A.
2d, 1929).
"Such is the position deliberately adopted in the upper court, In re James, 30 F.
(2d) 555 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929) (automobiles). In the lower court, top, this position,
though questioned, was accepted by the court 30 F. (2d) 551 (N. T). N. Y. 1929).
This practice is also tacitly upheld, though without direct reference to the matter
in many instances where the cases have been argued and deterpiied on other
grounds, and no question raised as to this point. See for instatce Commercial
Credit Co. v. Peak, supra note I5 (automobiles); Commercial Acceptance Trust
v. Bailey, supra note 43 (automobiles); Glass v. Continental Guaranty Corp., 81

Fla. 687, 88 So. 876

(1921), 25

A. L. R. 312

(1923)

(automobiles); Peneral Motors

Acceptance Corp. v. Hupfer, supra note x2 (automobiles); Scolt v. Industrial
Finance Corp. supra note 23 (automobiles); Jones v. Commercial Investment
Trust, supra note io (automobiles); Industrial Finance Corp. v. Cappleman,
supra note 4o (automobiles-holding, however, that recording act of South
Carolina, supra note 40, was broad enough to cover all securities)'
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to the chattel mortgage recording act even though phrased in the
language of trust, borrowed from tripartite trust receipt transactions. 6 That a bipartite purchase price security arrangement cannot
be upheld on the same basis as the tripartite trust receipt device
is due to the circumstance that the bipartite arrangement falls
within the range of the already established rules of law of pledge,
mortgage, or conditional sale, rules whose application has in earlier
times been worked out with reference to other and varying interests,
and whose limits have now become largely crystalized either through
stare decisis or through legislation. The law of trust receipts, as
currently applied, upholds the tripartite trust receipt as security
for the purchase price of goods without subjecting it to the narrowing restrictions applicable to the older, more familiar bipartite
security devices developed primarily to serve other ends and whose
limits were fixed primarily with reference to other interests. The
effectiveness of the tripartite trust receipt device as a credit carrier
for the purchase price of goods where the older forms of security are
ill adapted thus makes available a large range of productive business.
operations for the more complete satisfaction of human wants.
5See authorities supra notes 56-58.

